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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Regardless of how one interprets and rationalizes the supreme court's
methodology in arriving at its decision, the fact is that the court was
determined to protect the third party purchasers in this case. The result is
correct. This is so even if one considers the public policy favoring the
rights of heirs and society's strong interest in not allowing persons to
pauperize themselves.4 9 Reliability of the public records is an overriding
concern. Since the transfer involved "was a simulated sale, the third person
was neither put on notice of the possibility of a donation omnium bonorum
nor of the revocation rights of the heirs arising therefrom. An unwary third
party should not be penalized for the hidden intentions of others. Again,
title security and merchantability dictate this result.
The uncertainty that shrouds this area of the law makes it necessary
that more definitive rules be enacted. The legislature should act to circum-
vent inevitable court battles over whose rights should prevail in specific
public records disputes. The lawmakers must move to elevate and solidify
the function of public records in transactions affecting immovables 5s
Patrick Wise Gray
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS AS
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE PROPERTY
During the existence of the community, the attorney-husband con-
tracted to supply his services on a contingent fee basis. After the marriage
was dissolved and the community voluntarily partitioned, his wife sued to
rescind the settlement, claiming that the omitted contingent fee contracts
49. This societal protection against paupers is the basis of article 1497. There-
fore, anyone with a sufficient duty of support of the donor should be able to annul
the donation. It is also inconsistent that heirs can annul the donation when the
donor is dead and the need for protection no longer exists. See The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Successions and Donations,
37 LA. L. REV. 421, 426 (1977); Comment, 6 LA. L. REV. 98 (1944).
50. One possible change would be to protect positive reliance. For instance, the
Germans have what is called a "constitutive" system. Recordation produces self-
supporting rights not based on the chain of title. The French system, by compari-
son, is similar to Louisiana's in that it does not create rights but is merely "declara-
tive" of them. See Kozolchyk, The Mexican Land Registry: A Critical Evaluation,
12 ARIZ. L. REV. 308 (1970), for a comparative analysis of various systems. A
"constitutive" system, coupled with a requirement that the rights of heirs and
spouses be recorded, would make for a more reliable public records system in
Louisiana.
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were assets to be included in the inventory of the community. The trial
court disagreed and sustained the husband's objection to the discovery of
information concerning the contracts, but, on the wife's application for a
supervisory writ, the First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. I The husband
was granted certiorari on his contention that the contracts were his separate
property because they had not vested at the time of the community's
dissolution. In a unanimous decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
an attorney's interest in a pending contingent fee contract, which origi-
nates during the marriage, is a patrimonial asset and, therefore, "forms
part of the community insofar as its value is based upon the attorney's
services performed during the marriage." 2 Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161
(La. 1977).
The Louisiana concept of property includes, in a narrow sense, all
rights "to the exclusive use and enjoyment of corporeal things susceptible
of appropriation" ;3 more broadly, "property" extends to all patrimonial
rights-those susceptible of pecuniary evaluation, such as real or obliga-
tory rights. While rights to both corporeal and incorporeal things clearly
fit within the definition of "property," some confusion has arisen with
regard to the nature of rights created by obligations subject to suspensive
or resolutory conditions.
Several types of conditional rights have already received statutory or
judicial treatment. Under the Civil Code, causes of action, though condi-
tional, are considered as property; 5 however, the Code does not classify
other conditional rights, leaving the courts with the task of determining
whether or not other such rights are property. Louisiana courts have found
life insurance policies to be property; 6 however, because life insurance is
1. Due v. Due, 331 So. 2d 858 (La. App. lst Cir. 1976).
2. 342 So. 2d 161, 165-66 (La. 1977).
3. I A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 1 in 2 LoUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 1,
2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as YIANNOPOULOSI. Property is narrowly defined at
common law to mean the "legal relations between persons with respect to [corpore-
als or incorporeals]" and broadly defined to "include any relationship having an
exchange value." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, introductory note at 3-4 (1936).
Under Louisiana's framework, property in the narrow sense does not include
incorporeal rights.
4. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, § 75 at 217. "Patrimony may be defined...
in Louisiana law as a coherent mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities
attached to a person for the satisfaction of his economic needs." Id, § 77 at 223.
The concept of patrimony was developed by Aubry and Rau from the French
equivalent of Louisiana Civil Code articles 3182 and 3183. Id., § 74 at 213.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 426; LA. R.S. 13: 3864
(1950).
6. See, e.g., Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908); In re
Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
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sui generis,7 the classification of other conditional rights can hardly be
based upon an analogy to the classification of insurance. Although courts
in several states have found the potential right to collect under automobile
insurance policies to be property, 8 and thus a basis for quasi in rem
jurisdiction, the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit has
disagreed. 9 The classification of employee benefit plans arose in the 1956
Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Messersmith v. Messersmith,"° a
case involving the partition of a community. The court found that upon the
date of the dissolution of the community, the interest in the plan had "no
value as a tangible asset,"" and was contingent upon a future event. 12
Nevertheless, the majority decided that it was an "incorporeal, movable
thing' ' 13 and that "irrespective of its value or lack thereof, it is an asset to
be inventoried. . . .,"4
An attorney's contingent fee contract is analogous to deferred com-
pensation plans in that the obligation is aleatory 5 and subject to a suspen-
sive condition;' 6 however, it is different in that it is revocable at the will of
7. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Thomas, 170 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., II Orl. App. 55 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1914).
8. Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973); Turner v. Evers,
31 Cal. App. 3d 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216
N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
9. Grinnel v. Garrett, 295 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
10. 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
11. Id. at 510, 86 So. 2d at 174. The plan was a group annuity certificate which,
at the date of dissolution, had no cash or loan value.
12. Id. at 512, 86 So. 2d at 174. The certificate would become payable only if
the employee resigned, retired or died.
13. Id. at 511, 86 So. 2d at 174. The court cited Louisiana Civil Code article 460
as authority for the proposition that obligations are incorporeals; articles 470 and
475 to show that incorporeal things are classified according to their objects and that
if the objects are not immovables, the rights are movables; and article 870 to prove
that ownership is "acquired by inheritance ... by the effect of obligations, and by
the operation of law."
14. Id. at 510, 86 So. 2d at 174.
15. "A contract is aleatory or hazardous, when the performance of that which
is one of its objects, depends on an uncertain event... " LA. CiV. CODE, art.
1776. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2982. The object of the contingent fee contract,
the payment of the fee, depends on a settlement or a favorable judgment.
16. "Conditional obligations are such as are made to depend on an uncertain
event. If the obligation is not to take effect until the event happens, it is a
suspensive condition... " LA. CIv. CODE art. 2021. A successful recovery for
the client is the uncertain event in a contingent fee contract. Because the recovery is
the uncertain event which makes the contract both aleatory and conditional, the
contingent fee contract, like the insurance policy, is classified as a wager. See I S.
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the client due to the mandate relationship between the attorney and
client. 17 In 1944, a federal district court sitting in Louisiana ruled that
contingent fee contracts are not property. 8 Focusing on the "conjectural
value" of a contingent fee,' 9 the court determined that "[u]ntil judgment
• . .[there is no] vested interest or right, representing any degree of title
in fee. . ,,"o Thus the court refused to find that any property rights
exist under such a contract until final judgment.
Under Louisiana's community property regime, property owned by
married persons is classified as separate or community. Separate property
is described with some detail in the first portion of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2334, while, in a later paragraph, community property is defined as
the residual. 21 Civil Code article 2402 further defines community proper-
ty, inter alia, as the "produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both
husband and wife."
In analyzing whether a particular asset is separate or community, the
time and mode of acquisition are determinative factors. 22 This framework
causes little difficulty if the acquisition is entirely accomplished either
before, during or after the marriage. When, however, the acquisitive
process spans a change in the marital status, the courts are faced with the
problem of determining the time at which the asset is to be classified.
Three theories have evolved to deal with this problem: inception of
right, time of vesting, and pro rata. 23 The inception of right method
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 108 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 191, 192 (1969).
Since the contingent fee contract is legislatively authorized, it is legally enforceable.
But see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2983 & 2984.
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3028 provides in part that "[T]he principal may revoke
his power of attorney, whenever he thinks proper. ... LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950), as
amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 595, § I allows the attorney and client to contract
that "neither the attorney nor the client may, without the written consent of the
other, settle, compromise, release, discontinue or otherwise dispose of the suit or
claim .... " Nevertheless, the client has the absolute right to dismiss the attorney.
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Professional
Responsibility, 35 LA. L. REV. 420, 423 (1975).
18. Land v. Acadian Prod. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. La. 1944), rev'd on
other grounds, 153 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1946).
19. Id. at 351-52.
20. Id. at 351.
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334 provides in part: "Common property is that which
is acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner different from
that above declared." This paragraph often is referred to as the omnibus clause.
22. W. REPPY, W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY BY CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 103 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as REPPY & DEFUNIAK].
23. Id. at 220-21.
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classifies the entire asset according to the marital status existing at the
initiation of the acquisitive process, while the time of vesting test focuses
on the moment title passes, or the moment the right to the title vests. The
pro rata theory classifies the asset as partially community and partially
separate property, depending on what portion was earned during the
existence of the community and what part was acquired while the spouse
was single.
Louisiana courts have generally followed the time of vesting theory
24
in cases involving the acquisition of an immovable over a period of time,
and have held that no rights to the property arise until title passes. 25 Thus
immovable assets acquired partly during the existence of the community
and partly when the spouse was single, have been classified as entirely
separate or community property, depending on the marital status of the
parties when title ultimately vested. In cases involving movables, the
results have not been so consistent. Although the early federal case
discussed above involving a contingent fee contract seemed to apply the
time of vesting theory,26 recent Louisiana appellate court decisions con-
cerning employee deferred compensation plans have appeared to follow
the inception of right approach by classifying the employee spouse's rights
in the plan earned during the marriage as community property. 27 In these
24. Louisiana courts have not adopted the labels of inception of right, time of
vesting or pro rata, but do reach similar results.
25. Acquisitive prescription: In Crouch v. Richardson, 158 La. 822, 104 So.
728 (1925), the court focused on the time title vested, reasoning that the possession
was precarious and therefore, the inchoate title could be defeated at any time until
the end of 30 years, the time of vesting. Homestead: Early cases held that the
fulfillment of the requirements of the Homestead Act had a "retroactive effect to
the moment of the birth of the conditional right. ... Crochet v. McCamant, 116
La. 1, 7, 40 So. 474, 476 (1905) (inception of right). Crochet, however, was
overruled by Doucet v. Fontenot, 165 La. 458, 115 So. 655 (1928), and the courts
began classifying the property at the time title passed, reasoning that federal law
required such a result. E.g., Brewer v. Hill, 178 La. 533, 152 So. 75 (1933); Smith v.
Anacoco Lumber Co., 157 La. 466, 102 So. 574 (1924). Contract to Buy: When
considering immovables, Louisiana courts have held that the act of sale transfers
the title, and until then, real property is not acquired by the community; e.g.,
Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960); Kendall v. Kendall, 174
La. 148, 140 So. 6 (1932). With contracts to buy movables, however, the problem
does not arise since title vests immediately upon the sale.
26. Land v. Acadian Prod. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. La. 1944), rev'd on
other grounds, 153 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1946). The court refused to apply the retroac-
tive effect of a'realized suspensive condition reasoning that "[tlhe reopening of the
community after settlement is impractical." 57 F. Supp. at 352.
27. E.g., Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 295 So. 2d 809 (application *by plaintiff), 295 So. 2d 814 (application by
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cases, however, the non-employee spouse has received only an one-half
interest in the value of the plan at the date of dissolution.2 In T.L. James
& Co. v. Montgomery, 29 however, the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed
to follow the pro rata theory and found that each contribution made during
the community entitles the non-employee spouse to the "right to share pro
rata in the proceeds ultimately payable from the funds ...... 30
Similar problems are presented in cases involving classification of
money judgments awarded in personal injury actions. Although the cause
of action itself may be classified as either separate or community, the
portion of the recovery representing lost earnings has been classified,
independently of the cause of action, as partially separate and partially
community property. 3' Thus, it appears that while the cause of action is
defendant) (La. 1974); Langlinais v. David, 289 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974);
Laffitte v. Laffitte, 253 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); Laffitte v. Laffitte, 232
So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
28. In Laffitte v. Laffitte, 253 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), the wife
demanded payment for her interest in the pension plan before the husband began
receiving his pension payments. The court, however, held that she had no greater
rights to the fund than her former husband and, thus, she was not entitled to any of
the fund until the husband began receiving the payments. In Langlinais v. David,
289 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), the court ordered the husband, who had
begun receiving payments prior to final judgment, to pay the wife her total share
without any provision for periodic payments. More recently in Lynch v. Lawrence,
293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 So. 2d 809 (application by
plaintiff), 295 So. 2d 814 (application by defendant) (La. 1974), the husband was not
required to pay until he began receiving his monthly pension payments. The court
determined the proportion of each pension payment which was to be paid to the
wife until her community interest was fully satisfied.
29. 332 So. 2d 834, 849-58 (La. 1976) (on rehearing).
30. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
31. Where the husband was injured while still married, the courts have "made
two awards for damages: one to the community of acquets and gains for damages
accrued as of the time of the dissolution of the commmunity; and, one to the
husband for damages incurred after the termination of the community of acquets
and gains." Alfred v. Alfred, 237 So. 2d 94, 95 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. granted, 256
La. 847, 239 So. 2d 356 (1970) (apparently settled prior to argument). See also Talley
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 248 La. 785, 181 So. 2d 783 (1966). In West v. Ortego, 325 So. 2d 242 (La.
1975), a workmen's compensation action arose before the dissolution of the mar-
riage. The court determined that the settlement money and the cause of action were
not necessarily identical and resorted to equity to classify the money as separate or
community property, according to whether the damages were pre- or post-dissolu-
tion losses. See Note, 36 LA. L. REV. 1029 (1976). Contra, Broussard v. Broussard,
340 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1977), where the cause of action arose before the marriage, but
the settlement included damages for loss of future earnings. The court, however,
held that all of the monies were separate property, reasoning that at the time of the
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classified according to the inception of right theory, the classification of
the recovery may result in a pro rata apportionment.
In Due v. Due,32 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered for the first
time whether a contingent fee contract is capable of being classified as a
community asset when the contract is partially performed during the
community and partially after its dissolution. 33 The court concluded that
the rights under the contract were patrimonial assets capable of forming
part of the community to the extent that the services were performed
during the existence of the marriage. But before reaching that issue, the
court had to determine whether a contingent fee contract, prior to the
realization of its suspensive condition, could be classified as property
susceptible of being termed either separate or community.
The court determined that a contingent fee contract is a patrimonial
asset, and thus property, basing its decision on the premises that the
contract is an enforceable right and that it has value. Writing for the
majority, Justice Tate adopted Planiol's conclusion that "as long as the
[suspensive] condition is still pending . . . the simple possibility of the
realization of the condition, nevertheless, constitutes a chance which is
already considered an asset or liability." '34 After concluding that the
aleatory and mandatary nature of the contract did not make the "chance"
any less an asset, the court found that the rights under the contract had
pecuniary value because even if the attorney is dismissed or dies before
completion of the pending litigation, he is still compensated. Additionally,
the court noted that these contracts are treated as assets when law partner-
ships are dissolved.
Although the possibility of a quantum meruit 35 recovery seemingly
accident, the wife had not contributed anything to the community since it had not
been formed.
32. 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
33. The results under the Due court's analysis would not appear to be different
if the contract Was acquired before the marriage and performed during the marriage.
The value of the attorney's services performed prior to the marriage should be his
separate property, while the labor performed during the community would give rise
to a community asset.
34. 342 So. 2d at 164. Under Planiol's analysis it is important to find that the
chance constitutes a presently existing asset because "[t]he right dependent on the
happening of a [suspensive] condition . . . has as yet no existence." I M. PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE Pt. 1, no. 319 at 215-16 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
However, LA. CIV. CODE art. 2028, which has no corresponding article in the Code
Napol6on, provides that there is a presently existing right although "its exercise is
• ..suspended."
35. Although the cases cited by the court used the term quantum meruit, the
Due court avoided the use of the term which was recently criticized by the
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was a partial basis for finding that a contingent fee contract has value, the
court failed to explain that the circumstances giving rise to a non-contrac-
tual36 recovery are also uncertain events. Admittedly, when the attorney
dies 37 or is dismissed, the lawyer will receive some compensation, but this
is comparable to observing that the contingent fee contract has value after
a successful judgment is obtained. The court should have instead only
considered the value of the contract before any of these uncertain events
occurs because it is also possible that the attorney will lose the suit and
earn nothing. Thus, until the attorney wins, loses, dies or is dismissed, the
actual value of the rights under the contingent fee contract ranges from
zero to a portion of the ultimate recovery.
Prior to a settlement or a judgment, a contingent fee contract may,
however, be assigned a value. Civil Code article 204138 provides for a
retroactive effect to conditional obligations, such as contingent fee con-
tracts, when the condition is realized. Thus, the contractual rights are
always worth a specific pecuniary value as of the date of the contract even
though that value is not known until the condition is fulfilled. The court,
however, did not discuss this possibility39 but focused on the fact that
when law partnerships are dissolved, attorneys often agree on a value for
the contingent fee contract based on "informed estimates as to the pro-
spective recovery or settlement value of each case, the chances of loss,
and the amount of work involved before and after the dissolution or
withdrawal." 4 ° When the dissolution has not been so amicable, at least
Louisiana Supreme Court as a common law import. Oil Purchasers, Inc. v. Kuehl-
ing, 334 So. 2d 420 (La. 1976).
36. Upon the occurrence of such circumstances as the death or the dismissal of
the attorney, the contingent fee contract is at an end. E.g., Wright v. Fontana, 290
So. 2d 449 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974); Kramer v. Graham, 272 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973). The attorney cannot possibly recover under the contract, because he can
never fulfill the condition.
37. Although there are no Louisiana cases on point, it appears that the client
eventually must recover on his claim before the heirs can receive the deceased
lawyer's compensation. See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 3d 1375 (1970). When the attorney is
dismissed, he does not need to wait until the client eventually recovers before he
can sue for his services rendered. Kramer v. Graham, 272 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973).
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2041 provides in part that: "The condition being cbm-
plied with, has a retrospective effect to the day that the engagement was con-
tracted.
39. Under this analysis, the obligation already would have a value when the
community was dissolved, and therefore would be property, but the final settlement
of the community would have to remain open until the attorney-spouse either won
or lost the case so the value could be determined.
40. 340 So. 2d 1309 at n.5 (La. 1977).
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one court did not look to the prospective value of the contract but held that
the lawyer owed the partnership only the quantum meruit value of work
actually performed. 4 1 Regardless of the manner of valuation, there is little
doubt that the contract, even before the end of the litigation, does have
value and is, therefore, a partrimonial asset.42
By applying such a broad definition of property, the court has
expanded the concept of property in Louisiana. Under the Due court's
analysis, whenever an asset is acquired over a period of time, the condi-
tional rights can be classified as property. For instance, in the area of
acquisitive prescription, the rights gained through adverse possession
could have value, as would be demonstrated by a possessor who sells his
rights under a non-warranty deed.43 A similar analysis is applicable to
rights in pension plans, even before vesting occurs, because once an
employee begins to work, his employer agrees to provide him with a
retirement pension if he continues to work for the requisite number of
years." Additionally, if the rights under a contingent obligation are
property, the Due definition could allow a plaintiff to attach a potential
41. Trice v. Simon, 233 So. 2d 609 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
42. See Commissioner v. King, 69 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1934) (attorney had won
the case, but it was on appeal when the community was dissolved; court found that
the fee was community property by using the inception of right approach). Waters
v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946) (attorney had lost the case but
had secured a new trial when the opposition obtained a hearing in the California
Supreme Court; while awaiting the outcome of the supreme court's decision con-
cerning the validity of the grant of re-trial, the community was dissolved; the
divorce court found the pending contingent fee contract to be property and clas-
sified it under the pro rata theory as partially community and partially separate
property).
43. The prescriptive rights of the vendor are valuable when the vendee must
tack his possession onto the possession of his author in title. LA.CIv. CODE arts.
3493, 3494. The possessor or homesteader would have rights to the land, contingent
upon remaining on the land for a certain number of years. Since all of the years of
possessing or homesteading (industry and labor) are necessary for the acquisition of
the land, the Due analysis (see the text at notes 48-56, infra and note 25, supra)
would seem to classify a portion of the land represented by the years which occur
during the marriage as community property, while the remainder, representing the
years of possession elapsing outside the marriage, would be separate property. In
cases involving civil possession, the court may reach a different conclusion in that
this method of possession may not be classified as industry and labor.
44. Since the employee may never receive a pension right, perhaps the court
should grant the wife an interest only when and if the employee receives his pension
benefit. Otherwise he will have paid or will owe one-half the value of the fund
which he may not take with him should he terminate his employment. This will tend
to lock him into his present job in order to receive the benefits he was deemed to
have acquired. REPPY & DEFUNIAK, supra note 22, at 98. See note 51, infra.
obligation of indemnity under an insurance policy as property for a quasi
in rem action.45 Finally, the attorney's right to the fee under the contingent
fee contract may now be susceptible of seizure by his creditors.46
After determining the rights under the contingent fee contract to be
property, the court considered the issue of whether the contractual rights'
should be classified as community or separate property. Since the contract
was acquired during the community by the attorney's labor, it would seem
that the contractual rights were totally community property, especially if
the retroactive effect of the realized suspensive condition is recognized. Of
course, as an equitable result, it is as equally undesirable to classify the
entire value of the contract as community property as it would be to
classify it as completely separate. The court, therefore, apparently rea-
soned that the essence of the contract was the attorney's services rendered,
and determined that each unit of labor performed gave rise to a valuable
right of potential recovery. By applying Civil Code articles 2334 and
2402, the court reached a decision in accordance with the basic principles
of the community of gains and found that the community asset consisted of
only those contractual interests whose value is based upon the attorney's
"services performed during the marriage." 47
Unfortunately, the court did not provide much guidance to aid the
lower court in determining the value of the attorney's services; but it did
mention two methods of valuation when discussing the time at which the
wife could obtain her share. One method, similar to the pro rata theory,
gives the wife the right to share in the proceeds only when the fee is
collected,48 while the other gives her a "share of the estimated value of the
45. This result is contrary to the findings of the Grinnel court (see the text at
note 9, supra) insofar as that court considered the property issue. Cf. LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 5251(13). "'Property' includes all classes of property recognized under
the laws of this state: movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal."
46. Because of the mandate relationship between the attorney and the client,
the courts could find that the rights are not subject to seizure or that the contractual
rights are "strictly personal" and therefore "cannot be exercised by third per-
sons." YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, § 78 at 227-29.
47. 342 So. 2d at 166. The contingent fee includes not only the reasonable value
of the attorney's services, but also includes compensation for undertaking the risk
of receiving nothing if he loses the case. F.MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR
LEGAL SERVICES 28 (1964). The compensation for undertaking the risk, however,
seems to be inextricably interwoven with the attorney's labor, because he has not
really risked anything until he has worked. Thus, it would seem that the value of the
attorney's services should include the value of his work plus the payment for
incurring the risk of not receiving a fee.
48. 342 So. 2d at 166.
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community interest [in the fee] at the date of its dissolution."'49 Since the
latter method seems to assume the contract already has a certain value, the
wife would receive money even though the attorney could eventually lose
the suit and, therefore, receive nothing.50 This problem is avoided by the
first method of valuation, which allows the wife to share only when and if
the husband earns the fee. 5 The disadvantages of this method, however,
include the delay in reaching a final settlement of the community and the
difficulties presented in determining the apportionment. The court must
develop a fraction which represents the value of the attorney's work during
the marriage as the numerator and the value of his work during the entire
suit as the denominator.
One means to determine the fraction in the "share in the proceeds"
method, would be to use the number of hours expended as an indication of
the value of the attorney's work. Although admittedly arbitrary, it would
have the advantage of easy application.5 2 Perhaps the number of hours
could be treated as a rebuttable presumption of the value of the attorney's
work modified upon actual proof. Another method would be to determine
the reasonable fee an attorney would charge for the work done prior to the
dissolution of the community as the numerator and the reasonable fee a
lawyer would charge to handle the entire suit as the denominator. 53 The
reasonable value would be detemined not simply by the number of hours,
but also by the quality of each hour worked and the effect each hour had on
the ultimate recovery . Once the fraction is determined, the value of the
rights which represent community property would be calculated by the
product of the fraction and the fee.
Whether the court follows the "right to share in the proceeds"
method, seeks to determine the estimated value at the time of the dissolu-
49. Id.
50. For possible effects of this method on non-vested pension plans, see note
44, supra.
51. The wife should be protected from the possibility of having her rights
defeated in the event the husband withdraws without good cause. Since he would
never receive the fee, the contract would produce no asset classifiable as communi-
ty property and the wife would not obtain her share. Perhaps article 2404 could be
interpreted to protect the non-attorney spouse's interest in the community proper-
ty. The same reasoning would apply to other situations where assets are acquired
over a span of time, such as pension plans.
52. Although some attorneys may not keep records of hours worked, recon-
structing the number of hours expended may be easier than determining both what
the attorney did and the value of the work performed as of a particular date.
53. This was the procedure followed by the appellate court. Due v. Due, 331
So. 2d 858, 861 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
54. See Smith v. Westside Transit Lines, Inc., 313 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975).
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tion, or uses some other method, it should also consider the unreimbursed
expenses incurred by the attorney in handling the lawsuit. Under the
limited prior jurisprudence, 55 the courts would classify expenses as com-
munity or separate, depending on the marital status at the time the
expenses were incurred. Since all of the expenses are necessary to obtain
any recovery, the post-dissolution expenses benefit the contractual interest
which is classified as a community asset, as well as the interest classified
as a separate asset; and the same would be true of pre-dissolution ex-
penses. Thus the expenses should be distributed in a manner which would
reflect the portions of the contractual rights which are community assets
and those which are classified as separate. In determining the value of the
right, the expenses incurred are taken into account under the "estimated
value at the time of dissolution" method, but to achieve the same result
under the "sharing the proceeds" theory, the court must deduct the
expenses from the fee before multiplying by the fraction. 56 Even if the
attorney does not recover, the expenses should be apportioned, since they
were necessary to retain the chance of a recovery. As a practical matter,
however, in the case of no recovery where the expenses are moderate, it
may be preferable to follow the prior jurisprudence and classify the
expenses according to the marital status, rather than incurring the expense
and inconvenience of determining the proportional value of the attorney's
services just for the purpose of dividing expenses.
One final problem in finding that the pending contingent fee contract
creates property rights which form a part of the community is the possible
effect on the attorney's work product. It is contrary to ethical considera-
tions to withdraw from a lawsuit absent compelling circumstances, 57 and
the fact that the attorney will receive less money is not a valid reason to
withdraw from the suit.58 Realistically, however, since the suit is now
worth less to the lawyer, he could, even if subconsciously, place less
emphasis on it and could concentrate on suits acquired after the dissolution
of the community. Thus, while the spouse's interest may be protected, it
may be at the expense of the client's lawsuit.
55. Land v. Acadian Prod. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 338, 351 (W.D. La. 1944), rev'd
on other grounds, 153 F. 2d 151 (5th Cir. 1946); Due v. Due, 331 So. 2d 858,859 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976).
56. This mathematical computation is simpler than multiplying the fraction
times the expenses and subtracting that result from the product of the fraction times
the fee. The results are the same because the fraction representing the portion of
the expenses is the same as the one developed for the industry and labor.
57. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 2-32 (found in ARTICLES
OF INCORPORATION. LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4 app.)
[hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
58. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 2-110(C).
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Due v. Due continues a recent trend in the recognition of pro rata
apportionment as a means of determining the classification of assets
acquired over a period of time which spans a change in the marital
relation. Unfortunately the Civil Code does not seem to contemplate the
division of a single asset into both community and separate property, even
though the instances requiring such an apportionment are becoming in-
creasingly prevalent. The Louisiana legislature, in its current reevaluation
of the community property system, should consider providing a statutory
framework to alleviate this problem. Not only should the method of
classification be examined, but the legislature should also develop a means
by which the working spouse may be protected from paying the non-
working spouse one half of the community assets before he receives the
compensation. The legislature should also prevent the working spouse,
after the community is dissolved, from being able to divest himself, and
therefore the community, of the asset in fraud of his former spouse's
rights. Until this framework is achieved, the courts will be forced to rely
on a strained interpretation of the law in order to achieve the Code's
underlying principles.
Kenneth L. Hickman
ALDINGER V. HOWARD: A POSSIBLE PROBLEM
FOR PENDENT PARTIES?
A county employee was dismissed from her job by the defendant, the
Spokane County treasurer, and filed suit in United States District Court
claiming, under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 that the
discharge violated her substantive constitutional rights under the first,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments. Federal jurisdiction for this claim was
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).2 Plaintiff further asserted a claim under
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970): "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . ..
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance,
1202 [Vol. 37
